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Abstract
Temporal-difference (TD) algorithms have been proposed as models of reinforcement learning (RL). We examine two issues
of distributed representation in these TD algorithms: distributed representations of belief and distributed discounting
factors. Distributed representation of belief allows the believed state of the world to distribute across sets of equivalent
states. Distributed exponential discounting factors produce hyperbolic discounting in the behavior of the agent itself. We
examine these issues in the context of a TD RL model in which state-belief is distributed over a set of exponentially-
discounting ‘‘micro-Agents’’, each of which has a separate discounting factor (c). Each mAgent maintains an independent
hypothesis about the state of the world, and a separate value-estimate of taking actions within that hypothesized state. The
overall agent thus instantiates a flexible representation of an evolving world-state. As with other TD models, the value-error
(d) signal within the model matches dopamine signals recorded from animals in standard conditioning reward-paradigms.
The distributed representation of belief provides an explanation for the decrease in dopamine at the conditioned stimulus
seen in overtrained animals, for the differences between trace and delay conditioning, and for transient bursts of dopamine
seen at movement initiation. Because each mAgent also includes its own exponential discounting factor, the overall agent
shows hyperbolic discounting, consistent with behavioral experiments.
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Introduction
Temporal-difference (TD) learning algorithms have been pro-
posed to model behavioral reinforcement learning (RL) [1–3]. The
goal of reinforcement learning is to learn what actions to select in
what situations by learning a value function of situations or ‘‘states’’
[4]. (As noted by Daw et al. [5], it is not necessarily true that the
agent’s estimate of the world-state always corresponds to the actual
state of the world. We have already explored some of the potential
consequences of this mismatch in another paper [6] and will not
address it here.) In TDmodels, the value function is learned through
the calculation of a value-prediction error signal (termed d, [4,7,8]),
calculated each time the agent changes world-states. d reflects the
difference between the value-estimate and the actual value
(including immediate reward) observed on the transition. From d,
the value-estimate of the old state can be updated to approach the
observed value. This d signal appears at unexpected rewards,
transfers with learning from rewards to anticipatory cue stimuli, and
shifts with changes in anticipated reward [4,8]. This algorithm is a
generalization of the early psychological reward-error models
[9,10]. Components of these models have been proposed to
correspond to neurophysiological signals [1,2,8,11–14]. In partic-
ular, the firing of midbrain dopaminergic neurons closely matches d.
TD RL models have been able to provide strong explanations
for many neurophysiological observations, such as qualitative
changes in dopamine firing [1,5], including changes at first
thought not to reflect prediction error (e.g. generalization and
exploration [15]). More recent experiments have shown quanti-
tative matches to the predictions of these models [16–22]. In
addition, more recent models have been based on distributed
representations of belief within those state-spaces [5,23–26].
In this paper, we examine the effects of distributed state
representation, distributed value-representation, and distributed
discounting rate in TD learning.
N Distributed discounting rates along with distributed value
representation lead to hyperbolic discounting, matching the
hyperbolic discounting experimentally observed in humans
and animals.
N Distributed representations of state-belief allow the agent to
divide its believed state across multiple equivalent states. This
distributed state-representation can account for the slowing of
learning rates across intertrial intervals and trace conditioning
paradigms, and can account for dopamine signals seen at
movement initiation in certain instrumental conditioning
paradigms.
These two hypotheses are separable and produce separable
predictions, but together they form a coherent and parsimonious
description of a multi-micro-agent (mAgent) TD model of
reinforcement learning that provides a good fit to the experimental
data. We will make clear in the simulations below which
components are necessary for which results, and in the discussion
which predictions follow from which hypotheses.
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This multiple micro-agents model is consistent with anatomical
studies suggesting that the basal ganglia consist of separable
‘‘loops’’ that maintain their separation through the basal ganglia
pathway [27–29]. The model is also consistent with recent fMRI
studies suggesting that the striatum consists of functional ‘‘slices’’
reflecting a range of discounting factors [30,31].
Methods
It is important to note that the theoretical consequences of
distributed representation are independent of many of the
methodological details. However, in order to implement simula-
tions, specific choices have to be made. Throughout the methods
section, we will identify which simulation details are theoretically
important and which are not.
The simulation comprised two entities: the world and the agent.
The world consisted of a semi-Markov state space (MW ) with two
additions. First, it provided observations and rewards to the agent;
second, its current state could be changed by an action of the agent.
The agent consisted of a set of mAgents, each of which contained a
model of the worldMAi , a hypothesis of the state of the world si, a
value function of those states Vi :ð Þ, and an exponential discounting
factor ci. On each time step, a value-prediction-error di was
calculated independently by each mAgent. The overall agent
performed actions based on the state beliefs and value functions of
the mAgents, and the d signals of all mAgents could be averaged to
represent an overall d signal. The world and agent were simulated
in discrete time-steps. The world provided an observation or null-
observation to the agent on each time-step, and the agent provided
an action or null-action to the world on each time-step. See
Figure 1 and Table 1 for an overview of the model structure.
State-space/process-model
Both the world and the agent contain an internal state-space:
MW and MA, respectively. In principle it is not necessary that
MA~MW . In fact, it is quite possible for each mAgent to have an
individual world-model MAi . In the simulations used, all mAgents
used an identical state-space modelMA, defined as identical to the
world-model MW .
States corresponded to temporally extended circumstances
salient to the agent, such as being located at an arm of a maze
or waiting within an interstimulus interval. Transitions defined
jumps from one state to another. On entry into a state, a random
time was drawn from that state’s dwell-time distribution, which
determined how long the world would remain within that state
before a transition occurred. Observations provided feedback from
the world to the agent on each time-step and were drawn from the
P O Sjð Þ distribution, dependent on the actual state of the world
  
Figure 1. Model overview. The world communicates with the agent by sending observations and rewards and receiving actions. The world
maintains its own ‘‘true’’ state and dwell time in that state. The agent is composed of independent mAgents that each maintain a belief of the world’s
state and dwell time. Each mAgent has its own value estimate for each state and its own discounting factor, and generates an independent d signal.
The mAgents’ belief is integrated for action selection by a voting process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g001
Table 1. Variables and parameters used in the simulations.
Variables
MW world model
sW tð Þ current world state
tW tð Þ current dwell time in sW tð Þ
P O sjð Þ probability of observing observation O given state S
P s Ojð Þ calculated from P O sjð Þ
O tð Þ observation passed from world to macro-agent at
time t
A tð Þ action passed from macro-agent to world at time t
ci discounting factor, [ 0,1ð Þ for mAgent i
di tð Þ value-prediction-error for mAgent i
MAi mAgent world model (~M
W ) for mAgent i
si tð Þ hypothesized state for mAgent i
ti tð Þ hypothesized dwell time in si for mAgent i
Vi sð Þ value function for mAgent i
Parameters
nm number of mAgents 100
a learning rate 0:1
t time-step compression factor 1:0
exploration/exploitation 1:0  0:95ð Þ N rwds½ 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.t001
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S[MW . Rewards were a special type of observation, which
included a magnitude and were used in the calculation of d.
The world
The world consisted of a semi-Markov state process, a current
state sW tð Þ, a dwell-time within that state tW tð Þ, a current
observation O tð Þ, and a current reward R tð Þ. Only observation
(O tð Þ) and reward (R tð Þ) were provided to the agent.
A transition in the state of the world could occur due to a
process inherent in the world or due to the action of the agent. For
example, in our model of the adjusting-delay assay, the world will
remain in the action-available state (providing an observation of two
levers to the animal) until the agent takes an action. In contrast,
once the agent has taken an action and the world has transitioned
to one of the delay states (ISI-1, or ISI-2), the world will remain in
that state for an appropriate number of time-steps and then
transition to the reward state, irrespective of the agent’s actions.
The macro-agent
The macro-agent corresponded to the animal or traditional
‘‘agent’’ in reinforcement learning models. The macro-agent
interacted with the world and selected actions. Internal to the
macro-agent were a set of nm mAgents, which instantiated the macro-
agent’s belief distribution of the state of the world. Smaller nm yielded
noisier output. However, results were qualitatively unchanged down
to nm =10. Results were stabler with explicitly uniform distributions of
ci. The only simulation in which this made a noticeable difference
was in the measure of hyperbolic discounting (because the hyperbolic
function emerges from the sum of many exponentials).
Individual mAgents
Each mAgent i was fully specified by a five-tuple
Ssi, ti, ci, di, Vi sð ÞT, encoding the mAgent’s currently believed
state, si; the believed dwell-time, ti (i.e., how long since the last
state transition), the mAgent’s internal discounting parameter ci,
the current value-prediction-error signal di, and the mAgent’s
value estimation function Vi sð Þ. Each mAgent contained its own
individual discounting parameter ci, drawn from a uniform
random distribution in the range 0ƒciƒ1.
The state, si tð Þ, and dwell-time, ti tð Þ, of each mAgent are
hypotheses of the actual state of the world, sW tð Þ, and the actual
dwell-time, tW tð Þ of the world within that state. Even if the mAgent
knew the true initial state of the world, that hypothesis could
diverge from reality over time. In order to maintain an accurate
belief distribution, mAgents at each time-step computed the
probability P si tð Þ Oj tð Þð Þ, where O tð Þ was the observation
provided by the world at time t, and si tð Þ was mAgent i’s state
at time t. mAgents with low P si tð Þ O tð Þjð Þ updated their state belief
by setting si to a random state s
 selected with probability
P s Oj tð Þð Þ. This is one of three mechanisms by which mAgents
could change state (see below). An individual di value error signal
was computed at each mAgent state transition (see below).
Action selection
Actions can only occur at the level of the macro-agent because they
aremade by the organism as a whole. Because the state belief and value
belief are distributed across the mAgents, a mechanism was required to
select the best action given that belief distribution. In the model as
implemented here, the macro-agent simply ‘‘took a vote’’ from the
mAgents as to which action to perform. Each mAgent provided an
equally-weighted measure of the expected value for each action. The
exact action selection algorithm is not crucial but must take account of
the belief distribution and must balance exploration and exploitation.
Actions were selected based on an -greedy algorithm [4], with
decreasing with each trial. This produces exploration early and
exploitation later. At each time-step, a random number was drawn
between 0 and 1. If that number was less than , then actions were
taken based on the mAgents’ vote on what actions were possible. If
the number was greater than , then actions were taken based on
the mAgents’ vote on the expected values of the subsequent states.
started at 1 and was multiplied by a factor of 0.95 each time
reward was delivered, producing an exponential decrease in
exploration with experience.
Exploration. If the macro-agent decided to explore, the
action to be taken was drawn from a distribution based on which
actions the mAgent population suggested was possible.
X aj
 
~
X
i[mAgents
OK aj sij
  ð1Þ
where OK aj sij
 
was true (1) if action aj was available from
mAgent i’s believed state si and false (0) otherwise. Actions were
then selected linearly from the distribution of possible actions:
P select action aj
 
~
X aj sij
 
P
jX aj sij
  ð2Þ
Exploitation. If the macro-agent decided to exploit the
stored value functions, then actions were selected based on the
normalized expected total value of the achieved state:
Q aj
 
~
X
i[mAgents
E R s’ið Þ½ zE V s’ið Þ½ ð Þ ð3Þ
where s’i the state that would be achieved by taking action aj given
the current state si of mAgent i, E R s’ið Þ½  the expected reward in
state s’i, E V s’ið Þ½  the expected value of state s’i. E R s’ið Þ½  was
calculated from the internal world model MAi , and E V s’ið Þ½  was
calculated from the internal value representation stored in mAgent
i. If action a was not available from the current state of mAgent i,
mAgent i was not included in the sum. Because our simulations
only include reinforcement, only positive transitions were
included, thus Q aj
 
was rectified at 0. (Our simulations only
include reinforcement primarily for simplicity. The mechanisms
we describe here can be directly applied to aversive learning;
however, because the extinction literature implies that
reinforcement and aversion use separate, parallel systems [6], we
have chosen to directly model reinforcement here.) Actions were
then selected linearly between the possible Q functions:
P select action aj
 
~
Q aj
 
P
jQ aj
  ð4Þ
Once an action was selected (either from X aj
 
or from Q aj
 
),
a decision was made whether to take the action or not based on the
number of mAgents who believed the action was possible:
P take selected action aj
 
~
X aj
 
nm
ð5Þ
If the selected action was taken, the agent passed action aj to the
world. If the selected action was not taken, the agent passed the
Distributed RL with mAgents
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‘‘null action’’ (which did not change the state and was always
available) back to the world. If the macro-agent tried to take action
aj , but action aj was incompatible with the actual world state sW ,
no action was taken, and the ‘‘null action’’ was provided to the
macro-agent.
When proportions of actions were measured (e.g. in the
discounting experiments), proportions were only measured after
200 trials (by which time v0:0001).
mAgent transitions
There were three possible mechanisms by which mAgents could
make transitions between hypothesized belief states si?s’i.
1. Internal transitions. On each time-step, each mAgent i
decided whether to transition or not as a function of the dwell-
time distribution, given its hypothesized state si and its
hypothesized dwell-time ti. If the mAgent took a transition, it
followed the transition matrix stored within MAi .
2. Taking an action. If the macro-agent took action aj ,
providing A tð Þ~aj to the world, all mAgents were then
updated assuming the action occurred given the state-
hypothesis of the mAgent si. If the action was incompatible
with the mAgent’s state belief, the mAgent’s belief-state si was
revised as described below.
3. Incompatible observations. On each time step, each
mAgent i compared the observation provided by the world O tð Þ
with the observation expected given its internal hypothesized
state P O sijð Þ. If P O sijð Þ was 0 (meaning the observation was
incompatible with si), the mAgent transitioned to a new state
based on the probability of the state given the current
observation P s’jO tð Þð Þ.
Calculating the error signal: d
mAgents could experience a state transition as a consequence of
the macro-agent taking an action, as a consequence of its dwell-
time belief, or as a consequence of revising its state hypothesis due
to low fitness. No matter how the mAgent changed its state
hypothesis si?s’i, when mAgent i made a transition, it generated a
d contribution di according to
di~c
ti
i R tð ÞzVi s’i½ ð Þ{Vi si½  ð6Þ
where ci was the discounting parameter of the mAgent, ti was the
mAgent’s hypothesized time since the last transition, R tð Þ was the
observed reward at time t, s’i was the new state hypothesis to which
the mAgent transitioned, and si was the old state hypothesis from
which the mAgent transitioned. Of course, the process of
transitioning set the mAgent’s believed state to be s’i and ti to be
0. Note that R tð Þ is not a function of si, but rather delivered to the
agent from the world, based on the world state sW tð Þ. Note that
equation 6 is an exponential discounting function. Thus, each
mAgent performed exponential discounting. The macro-agent
showed hyperbolic discounting as an emergent process from the
set of all the mAgents. Also, note that both the value of the new
state and the current reward were discounted, as the sum of these
quantities represents the total expected value of making a
transition to a new state. Thus the sum R tð ÞzVi s’i½ ð Þ must be
discounted proportional to the time the agent remained in state si
before reaching the new state s’i.
On each mAgent state transition, the mAgent updated its internal
estimation of the value of its hypothesized state si, using its
individual di:
Vi si½ /Vi si½ zadi ð7Þ
where a was the learning rate. The mean of the di signals
P
i di

nm
from all mAgents conforms to the quantity reported in this paper as
‘‘the d signal of the model’’ but never appeared explicitly within
the simulation code. It is this total d signal, however, which was
compared to the population dopamine signal [13,32–35].
Results
Hyperbolic discounting
Value, as defined in reinforcement learning models, is the
integrated, expected reward, minus expected costs. The longer one
must wait for a reward, the more likely it is for an unexpected
event to occur, which could invalidate one’s prediction [36,37].
Agents, therefore, should discount future rewards: the more one
must wait for the reward, the less valuable it should be. In
addition, early rewards are more valuable than late rewards
because early rewards can be invested (whether economically or
ethologically) [36–38]. Any function that decreases with time could
serve as a discounting function. In many situations, humans and
other animals discount future rewards using a hyperbolic function
[38–42] matching equation 12 rather than equation 11 (Figure 2).
TD algorithms incrementally learn an estimate of the value
function, and thus require either a general analytical solution to
the discounting function or an incremental calculation such that
the value can be discounted with each timestep [8,43,44]. Because
the discounting rate changes with time in hyperbolic discounting
[38,41], the calculation cannot be performed incrementally [8].
We suggest a possible mechanism for generating hyperbolic
discounting via a multitude of exponential discounting factors. In
the limit as the number of exponential discounters (having
uniformly distributed discounting factors c) approaches infinity,
the average resultant discounting approaches hyperbolic. (See
Supporting Information Appendix S1 for mathematical proof.) In
practice, having dozens or more of exponential discounters
produces a close approximation to hyperbolic discounting.
Because each mAgent has an independent (exponential)
discounting factor but actions are taken by the macro-agent based
on a voting process of actions suggested by the mAgents, the
macro-agent will show a discounting curve that is the average of all
the mAgent discounting curves. If the mAgent discounting curves
are exponential functions with c uniformly distributed over the
range from 0 to 1, then the macro-agent will show approximately
hyperbolic discounting in its behavior. The hypothesis that
hyperbolic discounting arises from a (finite) set of exponential
factors is consistent with recent fMRI observations [30,31] and
suggests that the difference between this approximate hyperbolic
and true hyperbolic discounting could be tested with sufficiently
large data sets [45,46].
Simulations. In order to measure the effective discounting
function of our model, we modified the adjusting-delay assay of
Mazur [39]. A five-state state-space was used to provide the
macro-agent a choice between two actions, each of which led to a
reward. In short, the agent was provided two choices (representing
two levers): action a1 brought reward r1 after delay d1 and action
a2 brought reward r2 after delay d2. For a given experiment, both
rewards r1,r2 and one delay d1 were held fixed, while the other
delay d2 was varied. For each set of Sr1,r2,d1T, the delay d2 was
found where the number of a1 choices taken matched the number
of a2 choices taken in 300 trials. At this point, the actions indicate
that the two discounting factors in the two delays exactly
compensate for the difference in magnitudes of the two rewards.
Distributed RL with mAgents
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The delay d2 at this equivalent action-selection point can be
plotted against different fixed values of d1. The slope of that curve
indicates the discounting function used by the agent [39]. In the
case of exponential discounting (cD where c is the discounting
factor, 0ƒcƒ1, and D is the delay), the slope will be 1, regardless
of r1 or r2. In the case of reciprocal (R=D) discounting, the slope
will equal to the ratio of rewards r2=r1, and the y-intercept will be
0. In the case of hyperbolic discounting (R= 1zkDð Þ, [39,40,47]),
the slope will equal the ratio r2=r1, and in the case where k~1, the
y-intercept will be r2=r1{1. Simulations produced a slope equal
to the ratio of rewards r2=r1 (Figure 3) and a y-intercept
approximating r2=r1{1, indicating that, even though each
individual mAgent implemented an exponential discounting
function, the macro-agent showed hyperbolic discounting,
compatible with the behavioral literature [39–41,47,48].
Discounting across multiple steps. Temporal difference
learning can use any function as a discounting function across a single
state-transition. However, if hyperbolic discounting is implemented
directly, a problem arises when discounting is measured over a
sequence of multiple state transitions. This can be seen by comparing
two state-spaces, one in which the agent remains in state S0 for ten
timesteps and then transitions to state S1 (Figure 4A), and another in
which the time taken between state S0 and S1 are divided into ten
substates, with the agent remaining in each for one timestep
(Figure 4H). These two statespaces encode equivalent information
over equivalent time and (theoretically) should be discounted
equivalently. If temporal discounting were implemented directly
with equation 12, then the agent would show hyperbolic discounting
across the first statespace, but not the second.
We tested this explicitly by comparing four simulations (see
Figure 4):
1. Discounting is not distributed, and d is calculated by
d~
R tð ÞzV s’½ ð Þ
1zt
{V s½  ð8Þ
In this condition, the measured discounting of the model was
hyperbolic over a single-step state-space (Figure 4G). However,
over an equivalent chained state-space (Figure 4N), the macro-
agent discounted each state-jump hyperbolically. Since each
state had a delay of D= 1, the amount of discounting for each
state-jump was
1
1zD
~0:5, leading to exponential discounting
(with c~0:5) over the chain of states.
This occurred whether or not value representation was
distributed (Figure 4D,K).
2. Discounting is not distributed, and d is calculated by
d~c t=t R tð ÞzV s’½ ð Þ{V s½  ð9Þ
where c~0:75. In this condition, the measured discounting of the
model was exponential over both the single-step state-space
(Figure 4F) and the chained state-space (Figure 4M). This occurred
whether or not value representation was distributed (Figure 4C,J).
3. Discounting is distributed (i.e., each mAgent has a different
exponential discounting rate ci drawn uniformly at random
Figure 2. Discounting functions. (A) Exponential discounting reduces value by a fixed percentage over any time interval. Therefore the relative
preference of two future rewards does not change as the time to these rewards approaches. (B) In hyperbolic discounting, a later/larger reward may
be preferred over a sooner/smaller reward until the rewards draw closer, at which point choice preference can reverse so the sooner/smaller reward is
impulsively preferred. After Ainslie [38,41].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g002
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from 0,1ð Þ). d is thus calculated using Eqn. 6 as specified in the
Methods section. However, value representation is not
distributed; all mAgents access the same value representation
V sð Þ. Thus, Eqn. (7) was replaced with
V si½ /V si½ z adi
nm
ð10Þ
In this equation, although the mAgents could update different
states based on their hypothesized state-beliefs, all values were
united into a single universal value function V sð Þ. In this
condition, the macro-agent reverted to the one-step hyperbolic
equation in version 1 (Eqn 8), showing hyperbolic discounting
in the single-step state-space (Figure 4E) but not the chained
state-space (Figure 4L). In the chained state-space, the sum of
distributed exponential discounting rates produces hyperbolic
discounting across each state-jump, so across the chain of states
discounting was exponential (with c~
1
1z1
~0:5).
4. Both discounting (Eqn. 6) and value (Eqn. 7) are distributed.
This model showed hyperbolic discounting under both the
single-step state-space (Figure 4B) and the chained state-space
(Figure 4I). Because each mAgent has its own value represen-
tation for each state, the value decrease across each state-jump
was exponential, with each mAgent having a different c. Thus
the average value of a state was the average of these
exponentially-discounted values, which was hyperbolic.
Figure 3. Hyperbolic discounting. (A) State-space used. (B–E) Mazur-plots. These plots show the delay d2 at the indifference point where actions
a1 and a2 are selected with equal frequency, as a function of the delay d1 . The ratio of actions a1 : a2 is an observable measure of the relative values of
the two choices. Blue circles represent output of the model, and green lines are least-squares fits. For hyperbolic discounting, the slope of the line will
equal the ratio r2=r1 , with a non-zero y-intercept. Compare [39,40].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g003
Distributed RL with mAgents
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Figure 4. Discounting across state-chains. (A) Single-step state-space used for B–G. (B,E) When the model consists of a set of exponential
discounters with c drawn uniformly from (0,1), the measured discounting closely fits the hyperbolic function. (C,F) When the model consists of a
single exponential discounter with c~0:75, the measured discounting closely fits the function V~0:75D (exponential). (D,G) When the model
consists of a single hyperbolic discounter, the measured discounting closely fits the function V~ 1
1zD
(hyperbolic). (H) Chained state-space used for
I–N. (I) If values are distributed so each exponential discounter has its own value representation, the result is hyperbolic discounting over a chained
state space. (J,M) A single exponential discounter behaves as in the single-step state space, because multiplying exponentials gives an exponential.
(K,N) A single hyperbolic discounter now behaves as an exponential discounter with c~0:5, because each step is discounted by 1
1zD
, where D~1. (L)
Likewise, a set of exponential discounters with shared value representation behave as an exponential discounter with c~0:5, for the same reason.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g004
Distributed RL with mAgents
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It is still an open question whether real subjects show differences
between single-step and chained state-space representations. Such
an experiment would require a mechanism to change the internal
representation of the subject (as one state lasting for ten seconds or
as ten states lasting for one second each). This could be tested by
concatenating multiple delays. Simulation 1, using explicit
hyperbolic discounting, predicts that discounting across a chained
state-space will be much faster than discounting across a single-
step. Whether this occurs remains a point of debate [49]. The
model of distributed discounting and distributed values best fits the
data that discounting is hyperbolic even across multiple delays.
Non-uniform distributions of discounting rates. So far in
exploring distributed discounting, we have selected ci uniformly
from 0,1ð Þ. Using this c distribution, the overall agent exhibits
hyperbolic discounting as
1
1zd
. However, different c distributions
should produce different overall discounting functions.
We tested this by altering the c distribution of the mAgents and
measuring the resulting changes in discounting of the overall agent. In
the uniform distribution (which was also used for all other simulations
in this paper), P cvxð Þ~x, x[ 0,1ð Þ (Figure 5A). As was also shown
in Figure 4B, this results in hyperbolic discounting for the overall
agent (Figure 5B). Fitting the function
1
1zd
to this curve gives an R2
of 0.9999 (using 200 mAgents; the fit improves as nm increases). To
bias for slow discounting rates, we used the distributionP cvxð Þ~x2
(Figure 5C). The measured discounting of the overall agent using this
c distribution was slower (Figure 5D) and was well-fit by the function
1
1z0:5d
. To bias for fast discounting rates, we used the distribution
P cvxð Þ~ ﬃﬃﬃxp (Figure 5E). The measured discounting of the overall
agent using this c distribution was faster (Figure 5F) and was well-fit
by the function
1
1z2d
. These results match theoretical predictions for
the effect of biased c distributions on discounting [37]. Mathemat-
ically, it can also be shown that non-hyperbolic discounting can result
from c distributions that do not follow P cvxð Þ~xa; for example if
the c distribution is bimodal with a relative abundance of very slow
and very fast discounting mAgents.
Smokers, problem gamblers, and drug abusers all show faster
discounting rates than controls [48,50–53]. Whether discounting
best-fit by different time-constants is exactly hyperbolic or not is still
unknown (see, for example, [48,51,54], in which the hyperbolic fit is
clearly imperfect). These differences could be tested with sufficiently
large data sets, as the time-courses of forgetting have been: although
forgetting was once hypothesized to follow hyperbolic decay
functions, forgetting is best modeled as a sum of exponentials, not
as hyperbolic or logistic functions [45,46]. Similar experiments could
differentiate the hyperbolic and multiple-exponential hypotheses.
All subsequent experiments used a uniform distribution of ci.
Distributed belief
Because each mAgent instantiates an independent hypothesis
about the state of the world, the macro-agent can maintain a
distributed belief of world-state. We describe two consequences of
distributed belief that explain experimental data.
First, some situations contain readily identifiable cues which allow
those times when the agent is in those situations to be separated from
times when the agent is not. For example, during delay conditioning,
there is a specific stimulus (e.g. a light or tone) that is played
continuously through the delay. Separating ‘‘tone-on’’ situations from
‘‘tone-off’’ situations readily identifies the inter-stimulus-interval. Other
situations are not as readily identifiable. For example, during inter-trial
intervals and during the inter-stimulus interval in trace conditioning,
there is a gap in which the agent does not know what cues to attend to.
Our model simulates this cue ambiguity by representing the gap with a
Figure 5. Rate of discounting depends on c distribution. (A) The uniform distribution of exponential discounting rates used in all other figures.
(B) As shown in Figure 4, the overall discounting is hyperbolic. (C) A distribution of exponential discounting rates containing a higher proportion of
slow discounters. (D) Overall discounting is slower. (Note that it is now fit by the function 1
1z0:5D.) (E) A distribution of exponential discounting rates
containing a higher proportion of fast discounters. (F) Overall discounting is faster. (It is now fit by the function 1
1z2D
.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g005
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set of identical equivalent states. These equivalent states slow value
learning because each state only holds a fraction of the mAgent state-
belief distribution and therefore only receives a fraction of the total d
produced by a state-transition. We suggest that equivalent-states
explain the well-established slower learning rates of trace compared to
delay conditioning [55], and explain the slow loss of dopamine signal at
conditioned stimuli with overtraining [32].
Second, distributed belief allows TD to occur in ambiguous
state-spaces [5,6], which can explain the generalization responses
of dopamine [15,34] and the transient burst of dopamine observed
at movement initiation [56,57].
Trace and delay-conditioning
In delay conditioning, the CS remains on until the reward is
delivered, while in trace conditioning there is a gap between the CS
and US—the CS disappears before the US appears [55,58]. This
simple change produces dramatic effects: trace conditioning takes
much longer to learn than delay conditioning, and requires the
hippocampus, unlike delay conditioning [55,59,60]. One possible
explanation for the difference is that, because there is no obvious
cue for the animal to pay attention to, the intervening state
representation during the gap in trace conditioning is spread out
over many multiple ‘‘equivalent states’’. (There is new evidence that
trace conditioning requires hippocampus only under aversive
training conditions [61], which may suggest that other structures
can bridge the gap in appetitive trace conditioning. This does not
change our primary hypothesis—that trace conditioning entails an
‘‘equivalent states’’ representation of the gap between CS and US.)
Because the mAgents model can represent distributed belief, we
can model trace conditioning by placing a collection of equivalent
states between the cue and the reward. As noted above, because
value learning is distributed across those equivalent states, value is
learned more slowly than in well-identified states.
Simulations. In order to test the effect of a collection of
equivalent states in the inter-stimulus time, we simulated a
Pavlovian conditioning paradigm, under two conditions: with a
single state intervening between CS and US, or with a collection of
10 or 50 equivalent states between the CS and US. As can be seen
in Figure 6, the value of the initial ISI state (when the CS turns on)
V CSð Þ increases more quickly under delay than under trace
Figure 6. Trace and Delay conditioning paradigms. (A,B) Explanation of delay (A) and trace (B) conditioning. In delay conditioning, the cueing
stimulus remains on until the reward appears. In trace conditioning, the cueing stimulus turns back off before the reward appears. (C,D) State spaces
for delay-conditioning (C) and trace-conditioning (D). In delay conditioning, the presence of the (presumably salient) stimulus produces a single,
observationally-defined state. In trace conditioning the absence of a salient stimulus produces a collection of equivalent states. (E) Simulations of
trace vs. delay conditioning. Value learning at the CS state is slower under trace conditioning due to the intervening collection of equivalent states.
Larger sets of equivalent states lead to slower value-growth of the CS state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g006
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conditioning. This value function is the amount of expected
reward given receipt of the CS. Thus in trace conditioning, the
recognition that the CS implies reward is delayed relative to delay
conditioning. Increasing the number of equivalent states in the ISI
from 10 to 50 further slows learning of V CSð Þ (Figure 6).
Discussion and implications. Sets of equivalent states can be
seen as a model of the attention the agent has given to a single set of
identified cues. Because the stimulus remains on during delay
conditioning, the stimulus may serve to focus attention, which
differentiates the Stimulus-on state from other states. Because there is
no obvious attentional focus in the interstimulus interval in trace
conditioning, this may produce more divided attention, which can be
modeled as a large collection of equivalent intervening states in the
ISI period. Levy [62] has explicitly suggested that the hippocampus
may play a role in finding single states with which to fill in these
intervening gaps, which may explain the hippocampal-dependence of
trace-conditioning [55,59]. Consistent with this, Pastalkova et al. [63]
have found hippocampal sequences which step through intervening
states during a delay period. Levy’s theory predicted that it should
take some time for that set of intervening states to develop [62]; before
the system has settled on a set of intervening states, mAgents would
distribute themselves among the large set of potential states,
producing an equivalent-set-like effect. This hypothesis predicts that
it should be possible to create intermediate versions of trace and delay
conditioning by filling the gap with stimuli of varying predictive
usefulness, thus effectively controlling the size of the set of equivalent
states. The extant data seem to support this prediction [55,64].
The disappearance of CS-related dopamine signals with
overtraining
During classical conditioning experiments, dopamine signals
occur initally at the delivery of reward (which is presumably
unexpected). With experience, as the association between the
predictive cue stimulus (CS) and the reward (unconditioned
stimulus, US) develops, the dopamine signal vanishes from the
time of delivery of the US and appears at the time of delivery of
the CS [34]. However, with extensive overtraining with very
regular intertrial intervals, the dopamine signal vanishes from the
CS as well [32].
Classical conditioning can be modeled in one of two ways: as a
sequence of separate trials, in which the agent is restarted in a set S0
state each time or as a loop with an identifiable inter-trial-interval
(ITI) state [5,8,14,24]. While this continuous looped model is more
realistic than trial-by-trial models, with the inclusion of the ITI state,
an agent can potentially see across the inter-trial gap and potentially
integrate the value across all future states. Eventually, with sufficient
training, an agent would not show any d signal to the CS because
there would be no unexpected change in value at the time the CS
was delivered. We have found that this decrease happens very
quickly with standard TD simulations (tens to hundreds of trials,
data not shown). However, Ljungberg et al. report that monkeys
required w30,000 movements to produce this overtraining effect.
This effect is dependent on strongly regular intertrial intervals (W.
Schultz, personal communication).
The mAgents model suggests one potential explanation for the
slowness of the transfer of value across the ITI state in most
situations: Because the ITI state does not have a clearly identifiable
marker, it should be encoded as a distributed representation over a
large number of equivalent states. Presumably, in a classical
conditioning task, the inter-stimulus interval is indicated by the
presence of a strong cue (the tone or light). However, the appropriate
cue to identify the inter-trial-interval (ITI) is not obvious to the
animal, even though there are presumably many available cues. In
our terminology, the ITI state forms a collection of equivalent states.
Because all of these ITI states provide the same observation, the
agent does not know which state the world entered and the mAgents
distribute over the many equivalent ITI states. The effect of this is to
distribute the d signal (and thus the change in value) over those many
equivalent states. Thus the value of the ITI states remains low for
many trials, and the appearance of an (unexpected) CS produces a
change in value and thus a positive d signal.
Simulations. In order to test the time-course of overtraining,
we simulated a standard classical conditioning task (Figure 7A).
Consistent with many other TD simulations, the value-error d
signal transferred from the reward to the CS quickly (on the order
of 25 trials) (Figure 7B,C,E). This seemingly steady-state condition
(d in response to CS but not reward) persists for hundreds of trials.
But as the learned value-estimates of the equivalent ITI states
gradually increase over thousands of trials, the d signal at the CS
gradually disappears (Figure 7D,E). The ratio of time-to-learn to
time-to-overlearn is compatible with the data of Ljungberg et al.
[32]. Increasing the number of equivalent states in the ITI further
slows abolition of d at the CS (Figure 7E).
Discussion and implications. The prediction that the
inability of the delta signal to transfer across ITI states is due to
the ITI state’s lack of an explicit marker suggests that it should be
possible to control the time course of this transfer by adding
markers. Thus, if explicit, salient markers were to be provided to
the ITI state, animals should show a faster transfer of delta across
the ITI gap, and thus a faster decrease in the delta signal at the
(no-longer-unexpected) CS. This also suggests that intervening
situations without markers should show a slow transfer of the delta
signal, as was proposed for trace conditioning above.
Transient dopamine bursts at uncued movement
initiation
Dopamine cues occurring at cue-stimuli associated with
expected reward have been well-studied (and well-modeled) in
Pavlovian conditioning paradigms. However, dopaminergic sig-
nals also appear just prior to uncued movements in instrumental
paradigms [56,65] and can appear even without external signals
[57]. One potential explanation is that this dopamine signal is
indicative of an internal transition occurring in the agent’s internal
world-model, perhaps from a state in which an action is
unavailable to a state in which an action is available, thus
providing a change in value and thus providing a small d signal.
Only a few mAgents would have to make this transition in order to
produce such a signal and initiate an action. Once the action was
initiated, the other mAgents would be forced to update their state
belief in order to remain compatible with the ensuing world
observations.
Simulations. In order to test the potential existence of
dopaminergic signals just prior to movement appearing with no
external cues, we built a state-space which contained an internally- but
not externally-differentiated GO state (Figure 8A). That is, the GO-
state was not identifiably different in the world, but actions were
available from it. mAgents in the ITI state would occasionally update
their state belief to the GO state due to the similarity in the expected
observations in the GO and ITI states. If a sufficient number of
mAgents were present in the GO state, the agent could take the action.
Because the GO state was temporally closer to the reward than the
ITI state, more value was associated with the GO state than with the
ITI state. Thus, a mAgent transitioning into the GO state would
produce a small d signal. Taking an action requires the overall agent to
believe that the action is possible. However, there is no external cue to
make the mAgents all transition synchronously to the GO state, so they
instead transition individually and probabilistically, which produces
small pre-movement d signals. In the simulations, mAgents gradually
Distributed RL with mAgents
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transitioned to the GO state until the action was taken (Figure 8B, top
panel). During this time immediately preceding movement, small
probabilistic d signals were observed (Figure 8B, middle panel). When
these signals were averaged over trials, a small ramping d signal was
apparent prior to movement (Figure 8B, bottom panel).
Discussion and implications. As can be seen in Figure 8,
there is a ramping of delta signals as mAgents transfer from the ITI
state to the GO state. A similar ramping has been seen in
dopamine levels in the nucleus accumbens preceding a lever press
for cocaine [56, e.g. Figure 2, p. 615]. This signal has generally
been interpreted as a causative force in action-taking [65]. The
signal in our simulation is not causative; instead it is a read-out of
an internal shift in the distributed represented state of the macro-
agent—the more mAgents there are in GO state, the more likely
the macro-agent is to take action. Whether this ramping d signal is
a read-out or is causative for movement initiation is an open-
question that will require more detailed empirical study.
Other TD simulations
The mAgents model proposed here enabled novel explanations
and models for (a) hyperbolic discounting, (b) differences between
trace- and delay-conditioning, (c) effects of overtraining, and (d)
the occurrence of dopamine signals prior to self-initiated
movement.
However, TD models have been shown in the past to be able to
accommodate a number of other critical experiments, including (e)
that unsignaled reward produces a positive dopamine signal (dw0)
[5,8,18,24,32,34,66,67], (f) that phasic dopamine signals (dw0)
transfer from the time of an unconditioned stimulus to the time of
the corresponding conditioning stimulus [1,2,8,18,19,21,32,34], (g)
that dopamine neurons pause in firing (d decreases) with missing,
but expected, rewards [5,8,18,24,32–34], (h) that early reward
produces a positive dopamine signal (dw0) with no corresponding
decrease at the expected reward time [5,8,24,33], (i) that late
reward produces a negative dopamine signal (dv0) at the
Figure 7. Effect of equivalent ITI states on d signals at conditioned stimuli. (A) A state-space for classical conditioning. (B, C, D) Learning
signaled reward delivery. (B) Untrained: d occurs at US but not CS. (C) Trained: d occurs at CS but not US. (D) Overtrained: d occurs at neither CS
nor US. (E–H) Transfer of value-error d signal. Left panels show the first 50 trials, while right panels show trials 1000 to 10,000. Y-axes are to the same
scale, but x-axes are compressed on the right panels. Increasing the number of equivalent ITI states increases the time to overtraining. Compare [32].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g007
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expected time of reward and a positive dopamine signal (dw0) at
the observed (late) reward [5,8,24,33]. Finally, TD models have
been able to explain (j) dopamine responses to changing
probabilities of receiving reward [5,8,68], and (k) generalization
responses [15,34].
Extensive previous work already exists on how TD models
capture these key experimental results. Some of these cases occur
due to the basic identification of the phasic dopamine signal with d
[1,2,11]. Some occur due to the use of semi-Markov models
(which allows a direct simulation of time) [5,8,44]. Others occur
due to the distributed representation of belief (e.g. partially
observability [5,8,15,44]). Because our mAgents model is an
implementation of all of these, it also captures these basic results.
Although the results included in this supplemental section do not
require mAgents, the inclusion of mAgents does not lose them,
which we briefly illustrate here.
Unsignaled reward produces a positive d signal. When
presented with an unexpected reward signal, dopamine neurons
Figure 8. Modeling dopaminergic signals prior to movement. (A) State space used for simulations. The GO state has the same observation as
the ITI states, but from GO an action is available. (B) Due to the expected dwell-time distribution of the ITI state, mAgents begin to transition to the GO
state. When enough mAgents have their state-belief in the GO state, they select the action a, which forces a transition to the ISI state. After a fixed
dwell time in the ISI state, reward is delivered and mAgents return to the ITI state. (C) As mAgents transition from ITI to GO, they generate d signals
because V(GO).V(ITI). These probabilistic signals are visible in the time steps immediately preceding the action. Trial number is represented on the y-
axis; value learning at the ISI state leads to quick decline of d at reward. (D) Average d signal at each time step, averaged across 10 runs, showing pre-
movement d signals. These data are averaged from trials 50–200, illustrated by the white dotted line in C. B, C, and D share the same horizontal time
axis. Compare to [56].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g008
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fire a short phasic burst [32,34,69]. Following Daw [8], this was
modeled by a simple two state state-space: after remaining within
the ITI state for a random time (drawn from a normal distribution,
m~15,s~1 time-steps), the world transitioned to a reward-state,
during which time a reward was delivered, at the completion of
which, the world returned to the ITI state (Figure 9A). On the
transition to the reward state, a positive d signal occurred
(Figure 9B). Standard TD algorithms produce this result. Using
sets of equivalent states to represent the ITI extends the time that
the US will continue to cause a dopamine surge. Without this set
of equivalent ITI states, the dopamine surge to the US would
diminish within a number of trials much smaller than observed in
experimental data.
d transfers from the unconditioned reward to
conditioned stimuli. With unexpected reward, dopamine
cells burst at the time of reward. However, when an expected
reward is received, dopamine cells do not change their firing rate
[32,34]. Instead, the dopamine cells fire a burst in response to the
conditioned stimulus (CS) that predicts reward [32,34]. Following
‘‘the dopamine as d’’ hypothesis, this transfer of d from reward to
anticipatory cues is one of the keys to the TD algorithm [1,2,8,34].
We modeled this with a three-state state-space (ITI, ISI, and Rwd;
Figure 7A). As with other TD models, d transferred from US to
CS (Figure 7B,C,E). We modeled the ITI state as a set of
equivalent states to extend the time that the CS will continue to
cause a dopamine surge. In previous looped models, the dopamine
surge to the CS would diminish within a small number of trials,
giving a learning rate incompatible with realistic CS-US learning.
As with other TD models living within a semi-Markov state-space
[5,8], the delta signal shifted back from the reward state to the
previous anticipatory stimulus without progressing through
intermediate times [70].
Missing, early, and late rewards. When expected rewards
are omitted, dopamine neurons pause in their firing [18,32,33].
When rewards are presented earlier or later than expected,
dopamine neurons show an excess of firing [33]. Importantly, late
rewards are preceded by a pause in firing at the expected time of
reward [33]. With early rewards, the data is less clear as to the
extent of the pause at the time of expected reward (see Figure of
Hollerman et al. [33]). As noted by Daw et al. [5] and Bertin et al.
[24], these results are explicable as consequences of semi-Markov
state-space models.
In semi-Markov models, the expected time distribution of the
ISI state is explicitly encoded. mAgents will take that transition
with the expected time distribution of the ISI state. These mAgents
will find a decrease in expected value because no actual reward is
delivered. The d signal can thus be decomposed into two
components: a positive d signal arising from receipt of reward
and a negative signal arising from mAgents transitioning on their
own. These two components can be separated temporally by
providing reward early, late, or not providing it at all (missing
reward).
After training with a classical conditioning task, a d signal occurs
at the CS but not the US (Figure 10A). When we delivered
occasional probe trials on which reward arrived early, we observed
a d signal at the US (Figure 10B). This is because the value of the
CS state accounts for a reward that is discounted by the normal
CS-US interval. If the reward occurs early, it is discounted less. On
the other hand, when we delivered probe trials with late reward
arrival, we observed a negative d signal at the expected time of
reward followed by a positive d signal at the actual reward delivery
(Figure 10C). The negative d signal occurs when mAgents
transition to the reward state but receive no actual reward. The
observation of the ISI state is incompatible with mAgents’ belief
that they are in the reward state, so mAgents transition back to the
ISI state. When reward is then delivered shortly afterwards, it is
discounted less than normal and thus produces a positive d signal.
If reward fails to arrive when expected (missing reward), then
the mAgents will transition to the reward state anyway due to their
dwell-time and state hypotheses, at which point, value decreases
unbalanced by reward. This generates a negative d signal
(Figure 10D). The signal is spread out in time corresponding to
the dwell-time distribution of the ISI state.
d transfers proportionally to the probability of
reward. TD theories explain the transfer seen in Figure 7
through changes in expected value when new information is
received. Before the occurrence of the CS, the animal has no
reason to expect reward (the value of the ITI state is low); after the
CS, the animal expects reward (the value of the ISI state is higher).
Because value is dependent on expected reward, if reward is given
probabilistically, the change in value at the CS should reflect that
probability. Consistent with that hypothesis, Fiorillo et al. [68]
report that the magnitude of the dopamine burst at the CS is
proportional to the probability of reward-delivery. In the mAgents
model, a high probability of reward causes d to occur at the CS
but not US after training (Figure 11; also see Figure 7C and
Figure 10A). As the probability of reward drops toward zero, d
shifts from CS to US (Figure 11). This is because the value of the
ISI state is less when it is not a reliable predictor of reward.
Generalization responses. When provided with multiple
similar stimuli, only some of which lead to reward, dopamine
neurons show a phasic response to each of the stimuli. With the
cues that do not lead to reward, this positive signal is immediately
followed by a negative counterbalancing signal [34]. As suggested
by Kakade and Dayan [15], these results can arise from partial
observability: on the observation of the non-rewarded stimulus,
Figure 9. Unsignalled reward modulates d. (A) State-space used
for unsignaled reward. (B) d increases at unexpected rewards.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g009
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part of the belief distribution transfers inappropriately to the state
representing a stimulus leading to a rewarding pathway. When
that belief distribution transfers back, the negative d signal is seen
because there is a drop in expected value. This explanation is
compatible with the mAgents model presented here in that it is
likely that some mAgents would shift to the incorrect state
producing a generalization d signal which would then reverse
when those mAgents revise their state-hypothesis to the correct
state.
To test the model’s ability to capture the generalization result,
we designed a state-space that contained two CS stimuli, both of
which provided a ‘‘cue’’ observation. However, after one time-
step, the CS- returned to the ITI state, while the CS+ proceeded to
an ISI state, which eventually led to reward. Because (in this
model), both the CS’s provided similar observations, when either
CS appeared, approximately half the mAgents entered each CS
state, providing a positive d signal. In the CS- case, the half that
incorrectly entered the CS+ state updated their state belief back to
the ITI state after one time-step, providing a negative signal. In the
CS+ case, the half that incorrectly entered the CS- state updated
their state belief back to the ISI state after one time-step, providing
a lengthened positive signal. See Figure 12.
Discussion
In this paper, we have explored distributing two parameters of
the standard temporal difference (TD) algorithm for reinforcement
learning (RL): the discounting factor c and the belief state s. We
implemented these distributed factors in a unified semi-Markov
temporal-difference-based reinforcement learning model using a
distribution of mAgents, the set of which provide a distributed
discounting factor and a distributed representation of the believed
state. Using distributed discounting produced hyperbolic discount-
ing consistent with the experimental literature [40,41]. The
distributed representation of belief, along with the existence of
multiple states with equivalent observations (i.e. partial observability),
provided for the simulation of collections of ‘‘equivalent-states’’,
which explained the effects of overtraining [32], and differences
between trace and delay conditioning [55]. Distributed state-belief
Figure 10. Early, late, and missing rewards modulate d. (A) After
training, d is seen at CS but not US. (B) If reward is delivered early, d
appears at US. (C) If reward is delivered late, negative d appears at the
time when reward was expected, and positive d occurs when reward is
actually delivered. (D) If reward is omitted, negative d occurs when
reward was expected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g010
Figure 11. Probabilistic reward delivery modulates d at CS and
US. As the probability of reward drops, the d signal shifts
proportionately from the CS to the US. All measurements are taken
after training for 100 trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g011
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also provided an explanation for transient dopamine signals seen
at movement initiation [56,57], as well as generalization effects
[15].
Although the mAgents model we presented included both
distributed discounting and distributed belief states (in order
to show thorough compatibility with the literature), the two
hypotheses are actually independent and have separable
consequences.
Distributed discounting
The mismatch between the expected exponential discounting
used in most TD models and the hyperbolic discounting seen in
humans and other animals has been recognized for many years
[5,8,37,38,41,71,72].
Although hyperbolic discounting will arise from a uniform (and
infinite) distribution of exponential functions [37, 73, see also
Supporting Information Appendix S1], as the number of exponen-
tial functions included in the sum decreases, the discounting
function deviates from true hyperbolicity. Changing the unifor-
mity of the distribution changes the impulsivity of the agent
(Figure 5). We also found that because the product of hyperbolic
functions is not hyperbolic, it was necessary to maintain the
separation of the discounting functions until action-selection,
which we implemented by having each mAgent maintain its own
internal value function Vi sð Þ (Figure 4).
Other models. In addition to the suggestion that hyperbolic
discounting could arise from multiple exponentials proposed here,
three explanations for the observed behavioral hyperbolic
discounting have been proposed [37]: (1) maximizing average
reward over time [5,71,74], (2) an interaction between two
discounting functions [75–77], and (3) effects of errors in temporal
perception [8,37].
While the assumption that animals are maximizing average
reward over time [5,71,74] does produce hyperbolic discounting,
assumptions have to be made that animals are ignoring intertrial
intervals during tasks [37,74]. Another complication with the
average-reward theory is that specific dopamine neurons have
been shown to match prediction error based on exponential
discounting when quantitatively examined within a specific task
[18]. In the mAgents model, this could arise if different dopamine
neurons participated in different mAgents, thus recording from a
single dopamine neuron would produce an exponential discount-
ing factor due to recording from a single mAgent within the
population.
The two-process model is essentially a two-mAgent model.
While it has received experimental support from fMRI [76,77]
and lesion [78] studies, recent fMRI data suggest the existence of
intermediate discounting factors as well [30]. Whether the
experimental data is sufficiently explained by two exponential
discounting functions will require additional experiments on very
Figure 12. Effects of generalization on d signals. (A) State-space used for measuring generalization. (B,C) Either CS+ or CS2 produces a d signal
at time 0. (B) With CS+, the positive d signal continues as mAgents transition to the ISI state, but (C) with CS2, the (incorrect) positive d signal is
counter-balanced by a negative d correction signal when mAgents in the CS+ state are forced to transition back to the unrewarded ITI state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.g012
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large data sets capable of determing such differences [45, see
discussion in Predictions, below].
There is a close relationship between the exponential discount-
ing factor and the agent’s perception of time [8,79,80]. Hyperbolic
discounting can arise from timing errors that increase with
increased delays [79,81,82]. The duality between time perception
and discounting factor suggests the possibility of a mAgent model in
which the different mAgents are distributed over time perception
rather than discounting factor. Whether such a model is actually
viable, however, will require additional work and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Distributed Belief
The concept of a distributed representation of the believed state
of the world has also been explored by other researchers
[5,8,23,24,83]. In all of these models (including ours), action-
selection occurs through a probabilistic voting process. However,
the d function differs in each model. In the Doya et al. [23] models,
a single d signal is shared among multiple models with a
‘‘responsibility signal’’. In the Daw [5] models, belief is represented
by a partially-observable Markov state process, but is collapsed to
a single state before d is calculated. Our distributed d signal
provides a potential explanation for the extreme variability seen in
the firing patterns of dopaminergic neurons and in the variability
seen in dopamine release in striatal structures [84], in a similar
manner to that proposed by Bertin et al. [24].
Distributed attention. A multiple-agents model with
distributed state-belief provides for the potential for situations
represented as collection of equivalent states rather than as a single
state. This may occur in situations without readily identifiable
markers. For example, during inter-trial-intervals, there are many
available cues (machinery/computer sounds, investigator actions,
etc.) Which of these cues are the reliable differentiators of the ITI
situations from other situations is not necessarily obvious to the
animal. This leads to a form of divided attention, which we can
model by providing the mAgents with a set of equivalent states to
distribute across. While the mAgents model presented here requires
the user to specify the number of equivalent states for a given
situation, it does show that under situations in which we might
expect to have many of these equivalent states, learning occurs at a
slower rate than over situations in which there is only one state.
Other models have suggested hippocampus may play a role in
identifying unique states across these unmarked gaps [62,63,85].
While our model explains why learning occurs slowly across such
an unmarked gap, the mechanisms by which an agent identifies
states is beyond the scope of this paper.
The implementation of state representations used by many
models are based on distributed neural representations. Because
these representations are distributed, they can show variation in
internal self-consistency—the firing of the cells can be consistent
with a single state, or they can be distributed across multiple
possibilities. The breadth of this distribution can be seen as a
representation in the inherent uncertainty of the information
represented [86–90]. This would be equivalent to taking the
distribution of state belief used in the mAgents model to the
extreme in which each neuron represents an estimate of a separate
belief. Ludvig et al. [25,26] explicitly presented such a model using
a distributed representation of stimuli (‘‘microstimuli’’).
Markov and semi-Markov state-spaces
Most reinforcement-learning models live within Markov state
spaces (e.g. [1,2,67,91,92]), which do not enable the direct
simulation of temporally-extended events. Semi-Markov models
represent time explicitly, by having each state represent a
temporally-extended event [5,93–95].
In a Markov chain model, each state represents a single time-
step, and thus temporally extended events are represented by a
long sequence of states [93,94,96]. Thus, as a sequence is learned,
the d signal would step back, state by state. This backwards
stepping of the d signal can be hastened by including longer
eligibility traces [19] or graded temporal representations [25,26],
both of which have the effect of blurring time across the multiple
intervening states. In contrast, in a semi-Markov model, each state
contains within it a (possibly variable) dwell-time [5,8,93,97,98].
Thus while the d signal still jumps back state-by-state, the temporal
extension of the states causes the signal to jump back over the full
inter-stimulus time without proceeding through the intervening
times. As noted by Wo¨rgo¨tter and Porr [70], this is more
compatible with what is seen by Schultz and colleagues
[13,32,34,35,99–101]: the dopamine signal appears to jump from
reward to cue without proceeding through the intermediate times.
Semi-Markov state spaces represent intervening states (ISI
states) as a single situation, which presumably precludes respond-
ing differently within the single situation. In real experiments,
animals show specific time-courses of responding across the
interval as the event approaches, peaking at the correct time
[102]. The temporal distribution of dopamine neuron firing can
also change across long delays [103]. Because our model includes a
distribution of belief across the semi-Markov state space (the ti
terms of the mAgent distribution), the number of mAgents that
transition at any given time step can vary according to the
distribution of expected dwell times. While matching the
distributions of specific experiments is beyond the scope of this
paper, if the probability of responding is dependent on the number
of mAgents (Equation (5)), then the macro-agent can show a similar
distribution of behavior (see Figure 8).
Anatomical instantiations
The simulations and predictions reported here are based on
behavioral observations and on the concept that dopamine signals
prediction error. However, adding the hypotheses that states are
represented in the cortex [5,6,104], while value functions and
action selection are controlled by basal ganglia circuits [104–107]
would suggest that it might be possible to find multiple mAgents
within striatal circuits. Working from anatomical studies, a
number of researchers have hypothesized that the cortical-striatal
circuit consists of multiple separable pathways [27,28,108,109].
Tanaka et al. [30] explicitly found a gradient of discounting factors
across the striata of human subjects. This suggests a possible
anatomical spectrum of discounting factors which would be
produced by a population of mAgents operating in parallel, each
with a preferred exponential discounting factor ci. Many
researchers have reported that dopamine signals are not unitary
(See [8] for review). Non-unitary dopamine signals could arise
from different dopamine populations contributing to different
mAgents. Haber et al. [29] report that the interaction between
dopamine and striatal neural populations shows a regular
anatomy, in a spiral progressing from ventral to dorsal striatum.
The possibility that Tanaka et al.’s slices may correspond to Haber
et al.’s spiral loops, and that both of these may correspond to
mAgents is particularly intriguing.
Predictions
Hyperbolic discounting. The hypothesis that hyperbolic
discounting arises from multiple exponential processes suggests
that with sufficient data, the actual time-course of discounting
should be differentiable from a true hyperbolic function. While the
Distributed RL with mAgents
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 16 October 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 10 | e7362
fit of real data to hyperbolic functions are generally excellent
[39,40,48,110], there are clear departures from hyperbolic curves
in some of the data (e.g. [51,54]). Rates of forgetting were also
once thought to be hyperbolic [45], but with experiments done on
very large data sets, rates of forgetting have been found, in fact, to
be best modeled as the sum of multiple exponential processes
[45,46]. Whether discounting rates will also be better modeled as
the sum of exponentials rather than as a single hyperbolic function
is still an open question.
True hyperbolicity only arises from an infinite sum of
exponentials drawn from a distribution with P cvxð Þ~xa,
x[ 0,1ð Þ. Under this distribution, the overall hyperbolic discount-
ing is described by 1
1zkD
, where k~1=a. Changing the parameter
a can speed up or slow down discounting while preserving
hyperbolicity; changing the c distribution to follow a different
function will lead to non-hyperbolic discounting.
Serotonin precursors (tryptophan) can change an individual’s
discount rate [111,112]. These serotonin precursors also changed
which slices of striatum were active [112]. This suggests that the
serotonin precursors may be changing the selection of striatal loops
[29], slices [30], or mAgents. If changing levels of serotonin
precursors are changing the selection of mAgents and the mAgent
population contains independent value estimates (as suggested
above), then learning under an excess of serotonin precursors may
have to be relearned in the absence of serotonin precursors and
vice-versa due to the change in the population of mAgents
occurring with the change in serotonin levels.
In addition, in tasks structured such that exponential discount-
ing maximizes the reward, subjects can shift their discounting to
match the exponential to the task [113]. Drug-abusers [48,50],
smokers [51,52], and problem gamblers [53] all show faster
discounting rates than matched control groups. One possible
explanation is that these altered overall discounting rates reflect
differences in the distribution of mAgent discounting factors. As
shown in Figure 5, biasing the mAgent c distribution can speed or
slow overall discounting. Further, while a c distribution following
P cvxð Þ~xa exhibits hyperbolic discounting, other distributions
lead to non-hyperbolic discounting. Model comparison could be
used on human behavioral data to determine if subsets of subjects
show such patterns of discounting. However, this may require very
large data sets [45].
Distributed belief and collections of equivalent
states. The hypothesis that the slow development of
overtraining [32] and the differences between trace- and delay
conditioning [55] occur due to the distribution of attention across
collections of equivalent states implies that these effects should
depend on the ambiguity of the state given the cues. Thus, value
should transfer across a situation proportionally to the
identifiability of the that situation. Decreasing cue-ambiguity
during inter-trial-intervals should speed up the development of
overtraining (observable as a faster decrease in dopamine signal at
the CS). Increasing cue-ambiguity during inter-stimulus-intervals
should slow down learning rates of delay-conditioning. As the cues
become more ambiguous and less salient, delay-conditioning
should become closer and closer to trace conditioning. The extant
data seem to support this prediction [55,64].
Summary/Conclusion
In this paper, we explored distributing two parameters of
temporal difference (TD) models of reinforcement learning (RL):
distributed discounting and distributed representations of belief.
The distributed discounting functions provide a potential mech-
anistic explanation for hyperbolic discounting. The distributed
representations of belief provide potential explanations for the
decrease in dopamine at the conditioned stimulus seen in
overtrained animals, for the differences in learning rate between
trace and delay conditioning, and for transient dopamine at
movement initiation. These two hypotheses, although separable,
together provide a unified model of temporal difference reinforce-
ment learning capable of explaining a large swath of the
experimental literature.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Hyperbolic discounting can arise from a sum of
exponentials.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007362.s001 (0.03 MB
PDF)
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